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NOTES
APPELLATE REVIEW IN BIFURCATED TRIALS
Plaintiff sued defendant for damages arising out of an automobile
accident. In a separate suit, defendant sued plaintiff for damages arising
out of the same accident and prayed for a jury trial. The two suits were
later consolidated, with plaintiff's suit tried to a judge and defendant's
suit tried to a jury. The judge and jury reached opposite conclusions on
the issue of defendant's negligence. On appeal by all parties,' the First
Circuit concluded that neither result was manifestly erroneous and af-
firmed. In an ex parte decision, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed
and remanded to the court of appeal with instructions to resolve the dif-
ference between the findings made by the judge and jury and to render a
single opinion based upon the record. On remand, the appellate court
accepted the initial jury findings and reversed the findings of the judge.
Thornton v. Moran, 341 So. 2d 1136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), reversed
and remanded, 343 So. 2d 1065 (La. 1977), on remand, 348 So. 2d 79 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1977).
Some issues in a single trial are often tried by the judge, while others
are tried by a jury.2 Such bifurcated trials may result from stipulation
by the parties, from statutory denial of the right to trial by jury for cer-
tain issues or parties,3 or from consolidation of cases for the sake ofjudi-
1. It appeared that the defendant appealed only to maintain the status quo.
2. LA. CODE CiV. P. art. 1731 provides in pertinent part: "Except as limited by Article
1733, the right of trial by jury is recognized."
Id. art. 1733 provides:
A trial by jury shall not be available in:
(i) A suit demanding less than one thousand dollars exclusive of interest and costs;
(2) A suit on an unconditional obligation to pay a specific sum of money, unless the
defense thereto is forgery, fraud, error, want or failure of consideration;
(3) A summary, executory, probate, partition, mandamus, habeas corpus, quo war-
ranto, injunction, concursus, workmen's compensation, emancipation, tutorship,
interdiction, curatorship, legitimacy, filiation, separation from bed and board, an-
nulment of marriage, or divorce proceeding;
(4) A proceeding to review an action by an administrative or municipal body; and
(5) All cases where a jury trial is specifically denied by law.
3. Id. arts. 1733, 1735. See note 2, supra, for the text of article 1733. Article 1735
provides:
The trial of all issues for which jury trial has been requested shall be by jury unless the
parties stipulate that the jury trial shall be as to certain issues only, or unless the right
to trial by jury as to certain issues does not exist, but in all cases there shall be but one
trial.
cial economy.4
Although the Code of Civil Procedure recognizes the possibility that
judge and jury may act as separate triers of fact for separate and distinct
issues in the same trial,5 the Louisiana Supreme Court only recently per-
mitted the same issue to be decided by separate triers of fact. This ques-
tion initially arose in cases dealing with a litigant's right to a trial by jury
when the state or a political subdivision was a co-defendant. The legis-
lature has specifically denied the right to jury trial if the state or a politi-
cal subdivision is the only defendant,6 but situations have arisen which
were not envisioned by the legislative scheme. For instance, no provision
was made for suits in which the state is named as co-defendant with a
private party,7 or is joined as a third party defendant by a private de-
fendant,8 or for suits against a liability insurer of the state.9
In the late 1960's a conflict arose among the circuit courts of appeal
over whether a jury trial is permitted if a public body is a party to the
principal demand. The First Circuit ruled that there could be no jury
trial on any issue in which the state was one of several defendants. 10
The Second and Third Circuits took a contrary stance and ruled that the
judge should decide all questions relating to the public body and allow
the jury to decide all questions relating to the other defendants.I1  In
Jobe v. Hodge'2 the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the view of the
First Circuit and held that there could be no jury trial for any party if the
state is a principal defendant. The decision was based in part on the
court's desire to avoid conflicting decisions by the judge and the jury on
the same point.' 3
Subsequently, Jobe was expressly overruled in Champagne v. Ameri-
can Southern Insurance Co. 14 In that case the Louisiana Supreme Court
4. Id. art. 1561.
5. Id. arts. 1734, 1735.
6. LA. R.S. 13:5105 (1975). The Louisiana Constitution provides an exception to
this statute, allowing jury trials in expropriation proceedings. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4.
7. See Jones v. City of Kenner, 338 So. 2d 1385 (La. 1976); Jobe v. Hodge, 253 La.
483, 218 So. 2d 566 (1969).
8. See Champagne v. American So. Ins. Co., 295 So. 2d 437 (La. 1974).
9. See Duplantis v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Corp., 342 So. 2d 1142 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1977).
10. Abercrombie v. Gilfoil, 205 So. 2d 461 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1967).
11. Watson v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 214 So. 2d 395 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1968); Jobe v. Hodge, 207 So. 2d 912 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1968), aff'd, 253 La. 483, 218 So. 2d
566 (1969).
12. 253 La. 483, 218 So. 2d 566 (1969).
13. Id. at 495, 218 So. 2d at 571.
14. 295 So. 2d 437 (La. 1974).
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noted that the purpose of article 1731 of the Code of Civil Procedure' 5 is
to preserve inviolate the right to a jury trial, and that Louisiana jurispru-
dence regards the litigant's right to a jury trial as fundamental. 16 For
these reasons the court felt that the possibility of different decisions by
judge and jury on the same point should not affect the right to a jury
trial. The court noted that the trial judge has the power to set aside a
jury decision with which he is not in accord, 17 and that the appellate
courts have the right to review findings of fact of both judge and jury. 18
The court maintained that one may speculate about the practical difficul-
ties in cases where the judge and jury disagree, but that these difficulties
would be no more severe than those which might arise in separate ac-
tions against the state and individual defendants.' 9
In the recent case of Jones v. City of Kenner,20 the supreme court
held that a litigant could not be deprived of his right to a jury trial
against a non-governmental defendant merely because a governmental
defendant is joined as a party, "despite any identity or substantial simi-
larity of the issues against both."' 2' The court cited Champagne in hold-
ing that under article 1735 of the Code of Civil Procedure 22 there should
be one trial in which the jury decides only issues involving the non-gov-
ernmental defendant. The court again noted the procedural controls
available to prevent disparity of results in this combined single trial.
23
Unfortunately, the only guidance given in either Champagne or Jones
about the standard of appellate review and the weight to be given to the
findings ofjudge and jury was the statement in Champagne that the diffi-
culties are no more severe "than those which might arise in separate ac-
tions against the State and individual defendants."
24
The litigation in the instant case arose out of an automobile accident
in which an automobile driven by Miss Moran ran into the rear of the
Thorntons' vehicle. The Thorntons and Miss Moran filed separate suits,
15. See note 2, supra, for the text of article 1731.
16. 295 So. 2d at 439.
17. Id., citing LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 1812, 1813.
In the Thornton case, however, after motions for a new trial had been assigned for
hearing, the parties filed a Joint Motion for Withdrawal of Motions for New Trial in which
the parties agreed to forego a new trial and to submit the case to the appellate court for
review. Record, vol. 1, at 186, appeal docket 10953.
18. 295 So. 2d at 439, citing LA. CONST. art. V, § 10.
19. 295 So. 2d at 439.
20. 338 So. 2d 606 (La. 1976).
21. Id. at 608.
22. See note 3, supra, for the text of article 1735.
23. 338 So. 2d at 607.
24. 295 So. 2d at 439.
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each alleging the negligence of the other. In her petition, Miss Moran
asked for trial by jury; the Thorntons did not. These two suits were
consolidated for trial, with the Thornton suit tried to a judge, and the
Moran action to a jury. In the Thornton action, the trial judge found
that Mr. Thornton had been negligent but that Miss Moran had the last
clear chance to avoid the accident. In the Moran suit, the jury, like the
trial judge, found Mr. Thornton to be negligent but, unlike the trial
judge, found no negligence on Miss Moran's part.25
While motions for new trial filed by each party were pending, the
parties agreed to submit the cases to the appellate court for review. 26
The appellate court resolved not to be influenced by a tendency to seek
uniformity, 27 and viewed the findings in the consolidated cases sepa-
rately. Applying the "manifest error" rule,28 the court found neither
result egregiously wrong and affirmed each judgment. 29 Although a
consistent result is expected from a single trier of fact, the court rea-
soned, inconsistent results from separate triers of fact are not beyond the
realm of possibility, especially in delictual matters. Due to the flexibility
of the "reasonable man" standard, lawsuits are won and lost on person-
alities and crucial determinations which may hinge on a matter of
seconds, inches or feet.
30
25. Thornton v. Moran, 341 So. 2d 1136, 1139 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976).
26. Joint Motion for Withdrawal of Motions for New Trial, Record, vol. 1, at 186,
appeal docket 10953.
27. 341 So, 2d at 1142.
28. While the appellate jurisdiction of a Louisiana court of appeal extends to both law
and facts in civil cases, the "manifest error" rule sets out the standard of appellate review of
facts. The following language from Canter v. Koehring, 283 So. 2d 716, 724 (La. 1973),
accurately summarizes the manifest error doctrine:
When there is evidence before the trier of fact which, upon its reasonable evaluation of
credibility, furnishes a reasonable factual basis for the trial court's finding, on review
the appellate court should not disturb this factual finding in the absence of manifest
error. Stated another way, the reviewing court must give great weight to factual con-
clusions of the trier of fact; where there is a conflict in the testimony, reasonable evalu-
ations of credibility and reasonable inferences of fact should not be disturbed upon
review, even though the appellate court may feel that its own evaluations and infer-
ences are as reasonable. The reason for this well-settled principle of review is based
not only upon the trial court's better capacity to evaluate live witnesses (as compared
with the appellate court's access only to a cold record), but also upon the proper allo-
cation of trial and appellate functions between the respective courts.
See also Tate, "Manifest Error'--Further Observations on Appellate Review ofFacts in
Louisiana Civil Cases, 22 LA. L. REV. 605 (1962).
29. Thornton v. Moran, 341 So. 2d 1136 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976), reversed and
remanded 343 So. 2d 1065 (La. 1977), on remand 348 So. 2d 79 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
30. Id. at 1142.
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In an ex parte decision, the supreme court reversed the judgment of
the court of appeal and remanded the case to that court with instructions
to reconcile the differences in the factual findings, and to render a single
opinion based on the record.31 The court of appeal rendered judgment
in favor of Miss Moran, holding that the trial judge's application of the
last clear chance doctrine to the actions of Miss Moran should yield to
the jury's conclusion that she was not at fault.32
Thornton v. Moran represents a true test of the underlying basis of
appellate review in Louisiana civil cases. By its reversal of the First Cir-
cuit, the Louisiana Supreme Court has partially repudiated the manifest
error doctrine as the applicable standard for appellate review of fact.
According to this doctrine, in reviewing the findings of the initial trier of
fact, the appellate courts are constrained to accept the original findings
as long as they fall within a certain range of "reasonableness," even
though other conclusions may seem equally reasonable to the appellate
court.
This doctrine recognizes the trial court's greater ability to weigh the
credibility of witnesses, and is intended to effect a logical and efficient
allocation of functions between the appellate and trial courts. 33
Implicit in allowing both the judge and the jury to determine sepa-
rately a single issue of fact in one trial is the possibility that opposite
results will be reached. Opposite results certainly can be expected in the
analogous situation of separate suits arising out of the same accident be-
ing tried separately. Had the suits in the instant case not been consoli-
dated, failure to apply the manifest error doctrine to each result would
presumably have been reversible error.
The appellate court was apparently correct in its initial application
of the manifest error rule to the case at hand. The reasons which sup-
port the application of the manifest error doctrine do not change merely
because cases are consolidated. The Louisiana Supreme Court's devia-
tion in the instant case from its usual staunch adherence to the manifest
error doctrine is inconsistent with prior jurisprudence, and with the ra-
tionale underlying appellate review of fact. Although a consistent result
may be desirable, it is the trial court, and not the appellate court, which
31. Thornton v. Moran, 343 So. 2d 1065 (La. 1977). Justice Summers dissented from
the "exparte in chamber reversal of the judgment of the court of appeal without a hearing
and opportunity for the parties to be heard." Id. at 1065. Justices Calogero and Dennis
dissented, being "of the opinion the writ should be granted and the case taken up in this
Court in the normal course, with oral arguments followed by written opinion." Id. at
1065.
32. Thornton v. Moran, 348 So. 2d 79 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1977) (on remand).
33. See Tate, supra note 28.
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is the proper forum for reconciling divergent findings. The proper ap-
proach for the appellate courts to follow is a uniform application of the
manifest error doctrine.
Steven A. Glaviano
LOUISIANA'S USEFUL CLASS ACTION: WILLIAMS V. STATE
When you get the dragon out of his cave on to the plain and in the
daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see just what is his
strength. But to get him out is only the first step. The next step is
either to kill, or to tame him and make him a useful animal *
Five inmates of the state penitentiary attempted to bring a class ac-
tion on behalf of the approximately six hundred prisoners who had suf-
fered severe attacks of food poisoning. Negligent and unsanitary
preparation of the prison meal was the alleged cause of the contamina-
tion. Class certification was denied by the district court because of the
possible variance in damages to individual class members. The Louisi-
ana Supreme Court held that the class action remedy was available to
victims of this mass tort, even though there was a possibility of variance
in the individual damages. To satisfy due process requirements, how-
ever, the court utilized its inherent power to order notice to individual
class members in the absence of a statutory provision. Williams v. State,
350 So. 2d 131 (La. 1977).
Although unknown in civil law countries, ' the class action has been
adopted by statute in Louisiana. 2 The redactors of the Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure based the class action provisions upon Federal Rule
23, as it was written at that time. 3 Finding Louisiana's liberal joinder
* Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
1. Hamburger, State Class Actions and The Federal Rule, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 610
n.6 (1971). The class action is an invention of equity which allows a group of claimants
with a similar interest in a particular matter to sue through one or more representatives
without having to join each member of the class on a suit. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 41 (1940); C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 72 at 345 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as WRIGHT]; Comment, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-Litigation ofAir Crashes,
29 RUTGERS L. REV. 425, 427 (1976); Comment, Federal and State ClassActions. Develop-
ments and Opportunities, 46 Miss. L.J. 39, 40 (1975).
2. LA. CODE CIV. P. arts. 591-597.
3. LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 591, comment (b). As enacted in 1937, Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23 provided in part:
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